PROPOSAL FOR THE REMUNERATION POLICY OF EXOR N.V.

To be submitted to the 2022 AGM

INTRODUCTION

This remuneration policy (this “Policy”) will, upon approval by the shareholders’ meeting of EXOR N.V. (“Exor” or the “Company”) on 24 May 2022, replace the remuneration policy that was approved by Exor’s shareholders’ meeting on 20 May 2020. It describes the policies, structures and principles in the area of remuneration for the executive directors (“Executive Directors”) and the non-executive directors (“Non-Executive Directors”) of Exor.

Exor is a diversified holding company with a culture that combines entrepreneurial spirit and financial discipline. Our purpose is to build great companies, that perform to the highest standards, seek renewal and change, are distinctive and act in a responsible way, while providing opportunities for its people to grow, make a positive contribution to society and deliver superior returns to its investors.

This Policy supports Exor’s strategy, is suited to its performance-driven and meritocratic culture and is aligned with the identity, mission and values of the Company. Its objective is to provide a compensation structure that allows the Company to attract and retain the most highly qualified members of the board of directors (the “Board”) and to motivate them to achieve business and financial goals that create long-term value for shareholders in a manner consistent with the core business and leadership values of the Company.

Remuneration principles Executive Directors

In order to attract, retain and motivate with the right balance of qualities, capabilities, profile and experience needed to support and promote the growth and sustainable success of the Company and its business, this Policy aims to provide a total compensation opportunity that:

- is competitive as compared to the compensation paid by comparable companies;
- reinforces the Company’s performance driven culture and meritocracy;
- assures that the interests of the Executive Directors are closely aligned to those of the Company, its business and its stakeholders; and
- creates long-term value for shareholders and other stakeholders in a manner consistent with the core business and leadership values of the Company.

The compensation structure for Executive Directors includes fixed components (base salary, general benefits and retirement benefits) and variable components based on the Company’s short- and long-term performance. We believe that this structure promotes the identity, mission and values of the Company in view of its position as holding company and is designed to encourage the Executive Directors to act in the best interests of Exor in a sustainable manner.

Remuneration principles Non-Executive Directors

In order to attract qualified Non-Executive Directors with the required qualities, capabilities, profile and international experience, compensation is based on the following principles:
remuneration levels are in line with peers and with levels adequate to attract qualified Non-
Executive; and
remuneration is aligned with the responsibilities of the position and time spent.

The remuneration arrangements for Non-Executive Directors provide a simple and transparent structure
of fixed annual cash fees. In receiving fixed cash remuneration only, Non-Executive Directors can provide
independent, objective stewardship of the Company with no conflict between individual financial
interests and decisions made by the Board.

This Policy takes into account all applicable laws and regulations, such as, but not limited to, the
requirements of the Shareholder Rights Directive and its implementation into the Dutch Civil Code, the
Dutch Corporate Governance Code, Exor’s articles of association (the “Articles of Association”) and the
regulations of the Board, as applicable from time to time. All euro amounts mentioned in this Policy are
gross amounts.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The Policy was last amended by the general meeting of shareholders of the Company in May 2020 and
was approved by over 97% of the votes cast. In particular, the fact that the Company had decided to
postpone the introduction of a new long-term incentive scheme during the 2020 financial year in light of
the prevailing economic situation and the uncertainties of the COVID pandemic, was valued.

Executive compensation

During the past year, the compensation and nominating committee (the “CNC”) reviewed its approach to
variable compensation for Executive Directors, taking into account the long-term strategic opportunities
of Exor and the view of its shareholders expressed since the vote of the shareholders’ meeting on the
previous remuneration policy in 2020. A recurring theme in our shareholders’ feedback has been the
strong preference for long-term performance-based share incentives as the prime remuneration
component, instead of time-restricted share awards and options awarded under the previous policies.

This Policy offers a fundamental change in the structure of the executive remuneration package. It will
become primarily at risk with high performance conditions and is geared towards long-term value
creation. The focus on the long-term incentive consisting of performance elements only that are largely
dependent on the Company’s performance and results, reflects Exor’s long-term perspective and ensures
the interests of the Executive Directors are aligned with those of Exor.

This new remuneration package will apply to Executive Directors only and in effect, at this time, to the
CEO as the sole Executive Director of the Company. The principles of this Policy however guide
remuneration throughout the management levels with the share of pay at risk rising with rank and
responsibility.

The remuneration of the CEO will be set and accounted for in euros (“EUR” or “€”). The short-term
incentive (“STI”) is also being changed and the value is decreased substantially in line with a reduction of
the base salary. The financial metrics will be directly related to the value for shareholders, the Company
capital structure and cash returns realized which differentiates them from the return-based metrics of
the long-term incentive.

Structural change focuses on the long-term incentive (“LTI”) that, up to 2021, consisted of a grant of
options to a value of US$ 4 million per year (see the section Legacy Arrangements for further information).
As of 2022, this Policy will provide for an annual grant of performance share units (“PSUs”) to a value of
up to EUR 6 million. The increase in value, compared to the previous LTI reflects the increase of risk as the
pay-out can be zero. Upon vesting, PSUs may result in delivery of ordinary shares in the capital of the Company (“Shares”).

The PSUs may vest only if pre-set and stretching performance targets have been met and the Executive Director is still employed. The 2022 PSU plan will be based on Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”) for one half of the award and Net Asset Value (“NAV”) versus the MSCI-World Index (“MSCI-WI”) for the other half of the award. The CNC will include Environmental, Social and Governance (“ESG”) metrics upon the establishment and validation of relevant and measurable KPI’s, as soon as these can be applied in a reliable manner.

Target level performance is ambitious at a compounded annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of the TSR of 8% and NAV equaling the MSCI-WI over a three-year period. Maximum performance is only achieved at a compounded annual TSR growth rate of at least 20% and the NAV exceeding the compounded annual growth rate of the MSCI-WI by 10%, again over a three-year period. Pay-out will be three times the target amount to reflect the significant stretch in performance at this level. After vesting, an additional 2-year holding period applies, bringing the total holding period after grant to five years in compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code.

With the introduction of the new LTI, the first PSU vesting will take place in 2025. As there will be no PSU vesting in 2023 and 2024, the 2022 award will be equal to three annual grants, all vesting in 2025.

Non-Executive Compensation

The remuneration package for the Non-Executive Directors only contains one change compared to the remuneration package that has been approved by the AGM in 2020, being an amount of fixed fee for Non-Executive Directors that are a member of the newly installed Environmental, Social and Governance Committee is now also included (being EUR 7,500 for each member and EUR 10,000 for the Chair).

REMUNERATION POLICY EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

This section will set out remuneration for Executive Directors. The remuneration for Non-Executive Directors will be presented subsequent section.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION LEVEL

Exor monitors compensation levels and trends in the market and periodically benchmarks its executive compensation program and the compensation offered to Executive Directors against peer companies. To this end, a reference group of ten large listed investment companies has been composed with a comparable size and international portfolio, seven of which have a seat in Europe, two in the US and one in Asia. The level of Exor’s executive total direct compensation (“TDC”, i.e. base salary plus STI and LTI at target) is aligned with the Company’s relative position within the reference group.
REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

Executive remuneration may consist of the following primary components:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose &amp; link to strategy</th>
<th>Quantum</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed components</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base salary</td>
<td>The primary objective of the base salary (the fixed part of the annual cash compensation) is to attract and retain highly qualified Executive Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General benefits</td>
<td>A range of benefits may be provided to Executive Directors in order to place Exor in a competitive position (e.g. medical insurance, liability insurance, external advice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement benefits</td>
<td>Provides cost-effective, competitive post-retirement benefits in order to attract and retain highly qualified Executive Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable components</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term incentive</td>
<td>The primary performance objective is to incentivise Executive Directors to focus on the short-term financial or other business priorities as set by the CNC for the current year that serve Exor’s strategy and to enhance alignment with the value creation objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term incentive</td>
<td>The objective of long-term PSU grant is to (i) align the interests of the Executive Directors with those of our shareholders and other stakeholders; (ii) motivate the attainment of the Company’s financial and other performance goals and reward sustained long-term value creation; and (iii) serve as an important attraction and long-term retention tool that is being used to strengthen on-going commitment to the Company</td>
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The composition of the remuneration package is designed to fit the Company’s performance-driven nature. By its DNA, the Company’s focus is long-term and its purpose is to build great companies that perform to the highest standards in order to make a positive contribution to society and deliver superior returns to its investors over the long term.

In line with our purpose and strategy, the remuneration package consists primarily of variable components that are conditional on a long-term performance targets. When all performance targets are met in full, the base salary contributes 7% of TDC, the short-term incentive another 7% and the long-term incentive the remaining 86%.

The actual ratio between fixed and variable pay for the Executive Director will be influenced by the extent to which targets are met. The graph below presents the TDC granted at different performance levels, compared to the compensation under the previous remuneration policy including Stock Options (“SOs”) that is presented in the bar on the left:
The different components of the remuneration package will be described in the following paragraphs.

**Base Salary**

The fixed base salary takes into consideration the Executive Director’s skills, experience, scope of responsibilities and is set below competitive market levels. The Company’s policy is to periodically benchmark comparable salaries paid to other executive directors in its compensation reference group. Base salary increases are not guaranteed for Executive Directors. Salary increases will be made taking into account those awarded to the Company’s wider employee population. For 2022, the CEO’s base salary is set at EUR 500,000.

**General benefits**

Executive Directors may also be entitled to fringe benefits, including but not limited to, medical insurance, liability insurance, external advice and discounted fund management charges on funds managed by Exor. The CNC may grant other benefits to the Executive Directors in particular circumstances.

**Retirement benefits**

Provision of market competitive pension arrangements or a cash alternative based on a percentage of base salary. Currently, the CEO does not receive any retirement benefits.

**Short-term incentive (STI)**

Each year Executive Directors may be awarded an STI, depending on the performance delivered in the year. A balanced set of financial and non-financial performance measures referenced to the financial and strategic objectives of the Company for the financial year are set annually by the CNC, with appropriately stretching targets for each measure. The STI only pays out when the targets are fully met or exceeded. There is no reward for below-target performance, nor an extra award for over performance.

The STI performance metrics are directly related to the Company strategy of building great companies that perform at the highest standards. The financial metrics will always be directly related to the value for shareholders, the Company capital structure and the cash returns realized. In principle, the Loan to Value
ratio, the Free Cash Flow and overall cost control will be used. The CNC will review the adequacy of these metrics each year to ensure they support the situation and challenges at the time.

Any non-financial metrics will always be aimed at strategic priorities and be subject to pre-set targets. These metrics will be defined at the beginning of the year and rooted in the strategic plan of the Company.

Details of the performance measures, targets and the performance achieved will be disclosed in the remuneration report for the relevant financial year. The award is paid out either in cash or in Exor shares as soon as reasonably practical after the end of the financial year. If delivered in shares, the number of shares will be calculated by the market value on the date of grant up to the maximum allowable under this Policy.

*Long-term incentive (LTI)*

Each year, a grant of PSUs to a value of EUR 6 million can be awarded to the Executive Director. The number of PSUs to be conditionally granted will be calculated by taking the average closing price of a Share over the last 30 trading days prior to the date of grant. Appropriate stretching targets will be set at grant over a 3-year period for the two equally weighted performance measures: absolute total shareholder return (“TSR”) and net asset value (“NAV”) relative to the MSCI-World Index. An additional vesting requirement is continued employment, subject to the leaver arrangements set out in this Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance level</th>
<th>TSR (CAGR)</th>
<th>NAV (CAGR) vs MSCI-WI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threshold (0.5x target)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Not applicable*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum (3x target)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For NAV, the target level is in effect threshold: when NAV growth falls short of MSCI growth, no vesting takes place.

At the end of the three-year plan period, when the performance targets are met in full, all PSUs granted will vest, which means that the relating Shares will be delivered to the Executive Director. The maximum vesting opportunity is equivalent to 3 times the number of Shares corresponding to the PSUs granted and will be awarded when the TSR has a compounded annual growth rate of at least 20% and the NAV has an CAGR of 10% or more above the index. When TSR performance is at threshold, half of the PSUs granted in respect of the TSR target, i.e. 25% of the total PSUs granted, will vest, whereas, when performance is below threshold, no vesting takes place and the part of the grant is forfeited. With respect to the NAV performance target, the target level is in effect the threshold, i.e. when NAV growth falls short of MSCI growth, no vesting takes place and the part of the grant is forfeited. Subsequent to vesting, an additional 2-year holding period applies to the Shares to ensure sustainable performance and bringing the total holding period after grant to five years in compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code.

In designing this Policy, the CNC has considered to include Environment, Social and Governance targets that are pertinent to Exor’s strategy. The CNC has found however that to date no measurable and sufficiently pertinent metrics are available, although their development is in progress. If and when relevant measurable and predictable ESG metrics become available, the CNC will submit a proposal for their inclusion in the LTI metrics through an update of this Policy to the AGM.

**ADJUSTMENT OF VARIABLE COMPENSATION**

*Claw back and hold back*

The Company is entitled to recover variable remuneration either in full or in part to the extent that payment thereof has been made on the basis of incorrect information about the realization of the underlying goals or about the circumstances from which the entitlement to the variable award was made dependent in accordance with article 2:135(8) Dutch Civil Code. Furthermore, in accordance with article
2:135(6) Dutch Civil Code, Exor may apply hold back measures in relation to all variable remuneration of the Executive Directors.

**Reasonable and fair payout**

Is it expedient to include a discretionary authority of the Board to adjust payout or vesting if and when actual outcomes of strict policy implementation are not reasonable or fair.

**Leaver provisions**

Under the variable incentive plans, good leavers may be entitled to retain a portion of their awards on cessation of appointment on a pro-rated basis. Good leavers are defined as those who leave because of death, injury, ill-health, disability or the sale of the Company. The CNC will also have the discretion to determine that any other leaver should be treated as a good leaver. Bad leavers’ awards will lapse without any consideration being due.

**CONTRACT INFORMATION AND TERMINATION**

Exor has not entered into written agreements with its Executive Directors and Non-Executive Directors. Pursuant to the Articles of Association and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the term of office of Directors may not exceed a maximum period of four years at a time. A Director who ceases office in accordance with the previous provisions is immediately eligible for re-appointment.

There are no severance agreements between the Company and its Executive Directors which provide for indemnities in the event of early termination of the relationship, or for the granting or maintaining of non-monetary benefits for Directors who have left the Company, or for consulting arrangements covering periods after termination of the relationship or for compensation for non-competition agreements.

**Recruitment**

In the event that Exor wishes to recruit and appoint an Executive Director to the Board, the Board’s approach to remuneration is to pay no more than is necessary to attract the best candidates to the role. The approach to the recruitment of a new executive director aims to be competitive and to structure ongoing remuneration arrangements in line with this Policy.

The Board retains the flexibility to provide compensation (a ‘buy-out’) to replace variable remuneration awards forfeited or payments foregone. The Board will minimize buy-outs wherever possible and ensure they are no more generous than, and on substantially similar terms to, the original awards or payment they are replacing. Depending on individual circumstances at the time, the CNC has the discretion to determine the type of award (i.e. cash, shares, lock-up period and whether or not performance conditions would apply).

In the event that an internal candidate is promoted to Executive Director, legacy terms and conditions would normally be honored.

**Legacy arrangements**

The Board will respect any agreements made between Exor and the Executive Directors, irrespective of whether they are in line with this Policy, if the terms were agreed:

- Prior to the implementation of the Executive Board remuneration policy at the 2022 General Meeting of Shareholders; and
- At a time when the relevant individual was not an Executive Director of the Company nor agreed in respect of joining the Board as an Executive Director.
At the time of approval, the sole Executive Director of Exor, the CEO is a beneficiary of the 2016 Long Term Stock Option Plan - approved at the shareholder meeting of the Company’s predecessor, EXOR S.p.A. held on 29 May 2016.

Under the 2016 Long Term Stock Option Plan, the CEO was awarded a number of options in 2016 made in lieu of annual long-term incentive awards for the five years 2016 through to 2020. The final tranche of SOs granted to the CEO has vested in 2021, leaving 2,013,950 options outstanding of which 805,580 exercisable. Options that are not exercised by 31 December 2026 will be forfeited.

RENUMERATION POLICY NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
The remuneration of Non-Executive Directors may be periodically reviewed by the CNC and is as follows:

- EUR 50,000 for each Non-Executive Director;
- An additional EUR 15,000 for each member of the Audit Committee and EUR 20,000 for the committee’s Chair;
- An additional EUR 7,500 for each member of the Compensation and Nominating Committee and EUR 10,000 for the committee’s Chair; and
- An additional EUR 7,500 for each member of the Environmental, Social and Governance Committee and EUR 10,000 for the committee’s Chair.

Non-Executive Directors are not eligible for variable compensation and do not participate in any incentive plans. In compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, Non-Executives Directors are not eligible to compensation in the form of shares and/or rights to shares.

Non-monetary benefits and supplementary insurance coverage
The remuneration of Non-Executive Directors includes non-monetary benefits, such as, but not limited to reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and expenses for travelling required for the performance of the activities associated with the specific responsibilities assigned. For all Non-Executive Directors there is also an insurance cover for directors’ civil liability relating to claims for compensation for non-fraudulent acts performed in the performance of the director’s duties.

Contract information
The same contract and termination conditions apply for all Board members, as specified above Executive Directors i.e. no written agreement, a term of office of up to four years at a time, with immediately eligible for re-appointment.

GOVERNANCE & PROCESS

ROLE OF THE COMPENSATION AND NOMINATING COMMITTEE
The CNC is responsible for submitting a clear and understandable proposal to the Board concerning the Executive Directors remuneration policy. The Board determines the compensation for the Executive and Non-Executive Directors of the Company in accordance with this Policy.

The CNC may invite members of the Board, other competent functions (for example, legal or finance) or other relevant employees to their meetings. To avoid any conflicts of interest, the CNC meetings usually include a so-called ‘closed’ session, during which only members of the CNC are present and the other meeting attendees, including Executive Directors, are requested to leave. In this way, Executive Directors,
other Board members and other meeting attendees are not involved in any decisions, and are not present at any discussions regarding their own remuneration to avoid any conflicts of interest.

At least once every four years, the Committee will review the adequacy, overall coherence and effective application of the Policy and make recommendations to the Board in respect of any proposed changes, after which it will be submitted for approval to the general meeting of shareholders.

EMPLOYEE, SHAREHOLDER AND PUBLIC CONSIDERATIONS

In determining this Policy, the CNC has taken into account different scenario assumptions, the relationship between the performance criteria chosen and the possible results of the variable remuneration components and the manner in which this affects the remuneration of the Executive Directors (scenario analysis). As such, the Non-Executive Directors have assessed the functioning of the Policy taking into account the relationship between the Company’s objectives, the chosen performance criteria and long-term value creation.

In line with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code and the requirements of the Shareholder Rights Directive and its implementation into the Dutch Civil Code the internal pay ratio is taken into consideration to determine the Policy for Executive Directors. This Policy also seeks to enable the Company to provide a well-balanced and performance-related remuneration package which takes into account the broader public debate on remuneration.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY

Upon approval by the AGM, this Policy will be effective as per 1 January 2022. It will apply until a new policy will be submitted to and approved by the AGM, no later than the AGM of 2026. The implementation of the Policy in each financial year will be accounted for in the Remuneration Report.

Minor changes

The Board may make minor amendments to this Policy for regulatory, exchange control, tax or administrative purpose or to take account of a change in legislation without obtaining shareholder approval for that amendment. In the performance of this task, the Board receives input and support from the other Board committees.

Derogation

The Board may, in exceptional circumstances as deemed by the Board and within the statutory limits, decide to temporarily derogate from this Policy, and ultimately until a new remuneration policy is approved by a shareholders’ meeting. Exceptional circumstances shall cover only situations in which the derogation from this Policy is necessary to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of Exor as a whole or to assure its viability. Amongst others, by making its decision, the Board intends to take into account stakeholder support.

In the event of a derogation, the Board will present the derogation and proposed new remuneration policy to the shareholders’ meeting as soon as reasonably possible where it will be subject to a binding approval vote.

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